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Sociologists tend to value the importance of 
social relationships when dealing with social 
problems. This is not only because social 
relationships can be beneficial or detrimental 
to those who need help at an individual level, 
but also because they improve or exacerbate 
the quality of social well-being at the societal 
level. At the individual level, social support 
reduces the negative effects of stressful life 
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whereas Korean respondents likely ask help to fewer sources of support. Third, by using latent 
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events through the supportive action of others 
or through the belief that support is available 
(Cohen et al. 2000: 30). Traditionally, social 
connections in social sciences have been 
treated as a cure for social ills with which 
public institutions including governments 
cannot handle (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995; 
Skocpol et al. 2002). 
Even in Western societies where welfare 
policies were set in place relatively earlier 
and better developed, social relationships 
are regarded as alternatives for the problems 
that cannot be solved by public policies 
(Cohen et al. 2000). The importance of 
social relationships may be more strongly 
emphasized in East Asian countries where 
family, relatives, and friends play pivotal roles 
in managing all aspects of life. Moreover, the 
quality of life among people living in East 
Asian societies would be strongly affected by 
the existence of support networks. Without 
them, stable familial solidarity becomes 
dissipated, causing emotional support among 
family members to deteriorate.
This paper attempts to analyze the 
patterns of social support networks in 
Japan and Korea. Both societies have 
recently experienced changing population 
structure, deepening social inequality, and 
ineffectiveness of welfare policies. This paper 
assumes that these similarities between two 
societies intrigue us to examine their patterns 
of social support networks. Aging population 
in Japan and Korea is rapidly increasing, 
its proportion being 25.9% and 13.1%, 
respectively (Kim and Han 2012). Scholars 
and policy makers commonly point out that 
more social spending are needed to cope with 
problems found among the aging population. 
On the other hand, the importance of social 
support in Japan and Korea is receiving 
more attention as problems of inequalities 
including unequal income distribution, less 
social mobility, high unemployment rate, 
lack or ineffectiveness of welfare policies, 
and so on are becoming more aggravated. The 
intensification of inequalities directly leads 
to increase in the need for social protection 
by welfare policies. However, in Japan and 
Korea, rapid economic development has 
made it difficult to adopt public welfare 
measures for the disadvantaged. Rather, 
welfare policies are differentially beneficial 
only to the advantaged in a way that 
reinforces their relative shares of status. Due 
to intensified inequalities and ineffectiveness 
of welfare policies, the roles of social support 
networks are critical in coping with daily 
problems in Japan and Korea.    
The purpose of this paper explores 
the patterns of social support networks in 
Japan and Korea by analyzing International 
Comparative Survey on Lifestyle and Value 
(ICSLV), collected by Senshu University 
and Seoul National University. In order to 
understand what types of social support 
Japanese and Korean respondents perceive 
as available and attain, we outlined a map of 
social support networks. The social network 
analysis (SNA) is employed to expose the 
entire picture of social support network in 
two countries at the societal level. Then, 
we attempted to classify sources of social 
support by latent class analysis (LCA) at the 
individual level, which enables us to cluster 
Japanese and Korean respondents into several 
distinguished groups. The results from latent 
class analysis make it possible to understand 
what types of social support people are 
receiving or lacking in their daily lives. Since 
LCA classifies respondents into different 
groups according to whether or not particular 
social support networks are sustained, it is 
possible to create the variable on the patterns 
of social support networks. We investigate 
the relationship between socio-economic 
status (SES) and patterns of social support 
networks by applying multinomial logistic 
regression. We expect that these analyses 
expose how different and similar the patterns 
of social support networks are and what their 
determinants are in Japan and Korea. 
WHAT IS SOCIAL SUPPORT?
Social support is often conceptualized in 
a broad sense as “any process through 
which social relationships might promote 
individual well-being.” (Cohen et al. 2000: 4) 
In addition, social support is measured as a 
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combination of perception and actuality that 
one has assistance available from personal 
networks or public institutions and that one 
is part of a supportive social network when 
one faces daily problems and concerns such 
as unemployment, low income, sickness, old 
age, everyday surroundings, etc. (Lakey and 
Cohen 2000; Wills and Shinar 2000). Thus, 
this paper does not make a strict distinction 
between perceived and received social 
support. 
Social support networks in this paper 
encompass public institutions as well as 
familial and personal relationships. Support 
can come from many sources, such as 
family, friends, pets, neighbors, coworkers, 
organizations and others. Government-
provided social support is often referred 
to as public aid. Sources of support can 
be informal (e.g., family and friends) or 
formal (e.g., civil servants or community 
organizations). The sources of social support 
are important determinants of its effectiveness 
as a coping strategy. Thus, different support 
conveys dissimilar functions in our lives. 
There are diverse types of social support. 
Tardy (1985) described social support as 
coming from multiple sources and of being 
multiple types (Tardy 1985). Support types 
can be broadly classified under the labels 
emotional (e.g., nurturance), tangible (e.g., 
financial assistance), informational (e.g., 
advice) and companionship (e.g., sense of 
belonging). First, emotional support is the 
offering of empathy, concern, affection, love, 
trust, acceptance, intimacy, or encouragement. 
This is the support one receives through the 
feeling of warmth and nurturance. Emotional 
support can ensure the individual that he 
or she is valued. It is also referred to as 
“esteem support” or “appraisal support”. 
Second, tangible support is the provision 
of financial assistance, material goods, 
or services. It is also called “instrumental 
support”. This form of support consists of the 
concrete, direct ways that people assist one 
another. Third, informational support is the 
provision of advice, guidance, suggestions, 
or information. This type of support has the 
potential to help others solve problems they 
face. Fourth, companionship support is the 
type of support that gives someone a sense 
of social belonging. This can be seen as the 
presence of companions in shared social 
activities (Tardy 1985). The measurement 
used in this paper includes Tardy’s four types 
of social support (emotional, informational, 
instrumental, and companionship). 
SOCIAL SUPPORT IN EAST 
ASIAN CONTExT 
According to the previous literature, whether 
or not people can rely on social support 
significantly influence their emotional stability, 
physical health, economic conditions, quality 
of life, and so on (Cohen et al. 2000; Malecki 
and Demaray 2002). How people perceive 
and receive various sources of social support 
is undeniably important in every society. 
However, there may be differences in the 
roles and values of social support depending 
on a society’s cultural foundation. In East 
Asian culture, a person is seen as more of a 
collective unit in a society, whereas Western 
cultures are more rational and regard social 
support as a transaction in which one person 
seeks help from another. Scholars are left 
to identify the functions and roles of social 
support between East Asian and Western 
countries. 
It is risky to assume that East Asian 
societies have identical cultural traditions 
and social atmosphere and compare them 
with Western societies without a close 
examination of their essential differences. 
Do social support networks really work in a 
collectivistic way in East Asia as envisaged 
in previous literature? Straying away from 
this stereotypical image, we argue that East 
Asian cultural uniqueness is exposed to 
the risk of being simplified with common 
characteristics of its culture, laying at risk 
for its realities to be distorted especially for 
the topic of social support. Although it is 
true that family, relatives, and friends still 
remain as main sources of social support, 
after the rapid economic development and 
rationalization of societies, people became 
unlikely to expect unconditional support 
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from personal relationships. Rather, it would 
be safer to say that the exchanges of social 
support are outcomes based on the cost 
and benefit calculation and the expectation 
of future rewards from the recipient (Kim 
2006). If this is the case, it is necessary to 
scrutinize the patterns of supportive networks 
by examining the way that individuals 
intentionally construct their potential 
supportive networks. This is why we have 
resorted to a process of outlining social 
support networks in Japan and Korea by using 
the information on the types of relationship 
that people can utilize when needed. In 
addition, we also investigate how people can 
be classified according to which sources of 
social supports they perceive to have and or 
receive from. Also, it is necessary to examine 
why some can rely on all sources of social 
support including those coming from family, 
relatives, friends, public institutions and local 
groups, while others cannot. 
PATTERNS Of SOCIAL 
SUPPORT NETWORKS IN 
JAPAN ANd KOREA
Collective cultures in Japan and Korea 
have been rationalized and individualized. 
Rationalization and individualization pro-
duced a group of persons who can no longer 
expect help from personal relationships. 
According to NHK report, Japanese society 
is labeled as a “relationless society (無縁
社会)” in that people neither have time 
and money for nor express willingness to 
maintain social relationships. The situation in 
Korea is getting similar to that of Japan. With 
the rise of single households and decline of 
social capital, cases of lonely deaths, in case 
that the bodies of those who die alone are 
discovered later, are increasing (Tachibaniki 
2011; Park 2007). Of course, there exist 
differences between the two countries. It is 
known that Koreans are more likely to not 
only provide help to family members, kin, 
and close friends, but also receive help from 
them in face of daily difficulties compared to 
Japanese (Lee et al. 2016). Based on these 
different cultural tendencies, we can easily 
speculate that the importance of support 
from family, relatives, and friends in difficult 
times would hold a more significant position 
in Korean networks compared to that in the 
Japanese ones. 
What about the levels of reliance on 
aids through public institutions and welfare 
policies in two countries? The expectation 
of being able to rely on public entities in 
difficult times preserves people’s hopes. 
Despair arises from the belief that the result 
will be the same regardless of his or her 
effort. In this sense, we think that Japanese 
and Korean societies are appropriate for the 
study related to social support in East Asian 
contexts because, regardless of their splendid 
economic growth, social environment and 
welfare policies are considered to have let 
citizens down (Baldwin and Allison 2015). 
Lee (2011) argues that welfare policies are 
not effective to care for the daily lives of 
ordinary citizens in Korea and Japan because 
the governments in both countries developed 
large-company-oriented welfare production 
regimes (Lee 2011). Since the notion that 
public welfare is a social right is vague, it is 
impossible for the disadvantaged to rely on 
public or social protection (Kasza 2006). As 
a result, family, company, and community 
play major welfare role to those who need 
social support. In brief, due to the lack or 
ineffectiveness of formal intervention by 
public institutions, the importance of social 
support from personal relationships or from 
local groups including voluntary associations 
and neighborhood groups are growing larger. 
According to Kim and Lim (2016), the 
Japanese civil society is very active in the 
everyday lives of ordinary citizens whereas 
Korean civil society fails to accumulate 
mobilizing power over ordinary citizens 
(Kim and Lim 2016). As a consequence, in 
Japan, there is a plethora of small local groups 
and a paucity of large professional groups. 
Neighborhood associations are especially 
plentiful, but large advocacy groups are 
scarce. In contrast, in Korea, ordinary 
citizens do not take part in the activities of 
formal and civic organizations while they 
consistently form and join various informal 
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groups based upon primary relationships 
(Kim 2016). Korean civil society has been 
criticized for its “too-politicized tendencies” 
and “civil society without citizens.” Koreans 
tend to think that formal local groups 
including neighborhood groups, NPOs, and 
NGOs have nothing to do with their everyday 
lives. Decoupling of everyday lives and 
formal local groups persists (Kim and Lim 
2016). Given these differences in the features 
of civil societies between Japan and Korea, 
we can conjecture that Japanese citizens are 
more likely to rely on social support from 
local or civic groups in difficult times than 
are Korean citizens. 
Lastly, we are interested in accounting 
for why people belong to different clusters 
of social support networks. Why can some 
anticipate relying on all sources of social 
support while others cannot? In order to 
explain this, we focus on the stratification 
of supportive networks by the inequality in 
social economic status (SES). According 
to the IMF report (IMF 2016), the income 
inequality in Japan and Korea is growing 
from 1993 to 2016. The report points out that 
the most likely causes of inequality in two 
countries would be based on labor market 
imperfections. The report states, “for Korea 
and Japan, the duality between regular 
and non-regular employment has been a 
key driver of inequality, with non-regular 
employment constituting around one-third of 
the labor force.” (IMF 2016: 55).2 Regarding 
inequalities, Korea take the more serious 
toll. The share for the top 10% of population 
is almost 45% of the nation’s total income, 
which is the highest among OECD countries 
(IMF 2016). In sum, since welfare policies 
are not enough to help the disadvantaged and 
social spending cannot make low income 
families accessible to appropriate services 
leading to better outlooks, the availability of 
social support becomes critical in Japan and 
Korea (Kim 2016). 
The availability of social support, 
among other factors, is closely related to 
socioeconomic status of those who need 
help. The ability to access and mobilize 
valuable resources is likely to be determined 
by SES. The privileged with more resources 
tend to receive more help from various 
types of social ties than the disadvantaged, 
although the latter have higher probability 
to face difficult life events and to seek help. 
The sources of social support are unequally 
distributed according to wealth, income, 
occupation, position, education, and so on, 
leading to stratification of social support. 
Specially, the income is strongly associated 
with the ability to retain social support 
networks providing advice and help (Schafer 
and Vargas 2016). Thus, we can predict that 
the inequality in SES in Japan and Korea may 
reinforce social support disparities between 
the privileged and the disadvantaged. What 
one has determines one’s ability to mobilize 
help from others. Since both Japanese and 
Korean societies have recently witnessed 
the deepening of social inequality, high 
unemployment rate, and decreasing social 
spending, it is very likely that the stratification 
of social support is found in both countries. 
In addition, the effects of socioeconomic 
status on the presence of social support are 
more remarkable in Korea compared to that 
in Japan, because Korea’s social inequality 
is placed at the top among OECD countries 
(IMP 2016). 
There exist similarities and differences 
in the patterns of social support networks 
between Japan and Korea. This paper explores 
how similar or different the patterns of social 
support networks are between two countries. 
It also attempts to classify respondents into 
different groups according to the main sources 
of social support in which people maintain by 
using LCA, and then links the classification of 
supportive sources with socio-economic status 
measured by educational attainment, family 
income, and occupation. 
dATA ANd VARIABLES 
Our analysis is based on the Japanese and 
Korean data titled “International Comparative 
Survey on Lifestyle and Value (ICSLV)”. 
ICSLV was conducted to study lifestyle and 
values related to social well-being of Japan 
and Korea. The data was collected by using 
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web-panel in both countries.3These web-
panels include representative samples for 
both countries and their sizes are 11,804 and 
2,000, respectively. 
The ICSLV questionnaire includes 
the battery of social support networks. The 
question asks what extent respondents 
rely on fifteen different persons/ social 
groups/ institutions during difficult times. 
The fifteen sources of social support are: 
(1) local government, (2) school, hospital, 
or other public facilities, (3) police, (4) 
firefighting organizations, (5) armed forces, 
(6) political parties and politicians, (7) local 
groups (neighborhood associations, etc.), 
(8) volunteers, NPOs, civic groups etc., (9) 
temple, church, or other religious group, (10) 
employer, (11) co-workers, (12) neighbors, 
(13) close family, (14) relatives, and (15) 
friends and acquaintances. The sample 
question is, “what people or organizations 
do you rely upon to help you deal with 
your personal daily problems and concerns 
(unemployment, low income, sickness, 
old age, everyday surroundings, etc.)? 
Respondents were asked to answer the fifteen 
questions independently on a scale of 1 to 5 
(1= don’t rely at all, 2= hardly rely on at all, 
3= somewhat rely on, 4= rely on, 5= rely on 
a lot). 
In order to apply social network analysis, 
latent class analysis, and multinomial logistic 
regression model, we recoded 1, 2, 3 into 0, 
and 4 and 5 into 1 for 15 variables of social 
support networks. “1” indicates the existence 
of reliance ties, whereas “0” represents the 
absence of ties. This binary variable allows 
us to generate reliance network matrices 
of binary values and to employ latent class 
analysis to classify respondents into different 
clusters according to sources of social 
support.  
Regarding the multinomial logistic 
regression, based on the results of LCA 
above, we created a dependent variable 
containing information on classification of 
support sources. We included socio-economic 
status such as family income, educational 
attainment, and occupation as independent 
variables and socio-demographics including 
age, gender, marital status, number of 
children, and religion as controls. The mean 
number of children of Japanese and Korean 
respondents are 1.1 (standard deviation = 
1.15, minimum = 0, maximum = 7) and 1.1 
(standard deviation = 1.01, minimum = 0, 
maximum = 5), respectively. 
RESULTS
Structure of Social Support Networks in 
Japan and Korea
We attempt to show the overall patterns of 
social support networks by using a two-mode 
network analysis. We linked a total of 11,804 
respondents to 15 sources of social support, 
yielding 177,060 cells in total (11,804×15) 
for the Japanese case. In the same way, the 
matrices of Korean case consist of 30,000 
cells linking a total of 2,000 respondents to 
15 sources of people or groups. The two-
mode network analysis includes two types 
of nodeactors and affiliations, while most of 
the network analyses involve a single type of 
node (e.g., actors) in general. In this paper, one 
mode of the network represents respondents 
and another represents persons or groups that 
respondents rely on facing daily problems 
and concerns. We investigated geodesic 
distance and nodal degree centrality, and 
then illustrated the patterns of the support 
networks for the two countries.4
Table 1 shows the degree centrality 
of each node representing the entities that 
respondents rely on facing daily problems 
and concerns in Japan and Korea.5 In Japan, 
family has the greatest degree centrality 
followed by friends and relatives, suggesting 
that the majority of the Japanese rely on 
close family, friends, and relatives when 
they are in trouble. Religion and politicians 
are regarded as least helpful. Japanese 
respondents are more likely to look for help 
from public institutions, local government, 
neighborhood associations, and local groups. 
As expected earlier, Japanese local groups 
and neighborhood associations are closely 
related to the lives of ordinary citizens 
especially when they are facing difficult life 
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events.
In Korea, family has the greatest degree 
centrality compared to other sources of social 
support. Schools, hospitals, or other public 
facilities as well as relatives and friends 
are also strong sources of social support. 
Neither political parties and politicians nor 
local groups are as helpful as other sources 
of social support in Korea. It is noteworthy 
that the degree centrality of local groups is 
placed at the bottom in Korea, indicating 
that Korean citizens do not perceive local 
groups as being helpful when they are in 
need. The less influences of local groups and 
neighborhood associations in Korea confirm 
our previous expectation that the lives of 
Korean ordinary citizens are not associated 
with activities of civic groups. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate 
entire social support networks in Japan 
and in Korea, respectively. In both 
figures, ‘government’ represents (1) local 
government office, ‘institution’ refers to (2) 
schools, hospitals, or other public facilities, 
‘police’, and ‘military’ indicate (3) police, 
(4) firefighting organizations, and (5) armed 
forces, respectively. ‘Politician’ includes (6) 
political parties and politicians, ‘local’ is (7) 
local groups and neighborhood associations, 
and ‘NGOs’ involves (8) volunteers, NPOs, 
civic groups, etc. ‘Religion’ represents 
(9) temple, church, or other religious 
groups. ‘Employer and coworker’ are (10) 
employer, and (11) co-workers, respectively. 
‘Neighbor’ refers to (12) neighbors, ‘family’ 
represents (13) close family, relative is (14) 
relatives, and ‘friend’ involves (15) friends 
and acquaintances. The size of the circle is 
proportional to its degree centrality, and the 
location of the circle indicates its relative 
position in the whole support network. The 
gray line indicates ties linking individuals to 
the people, groups, institutions of which they 
rely on.
Looking at the way that all sources of 
social support are distributed within the 
networks, it is revealed that they are much 
more concentrated at the center in Japan than 
in Korea. It means that Japanese respondents 
are more likely to have multiple sources 
of social support compared to Korean 
respondents. For example, while Japanese 
respondents tend to rely on public institutions 
as well as personal relationships when they 
are in trouble, Korean respondents likely ask 
help to fewer sources. These differences in 
Table 1. Degree Centrality of Sources of Social Support in Japan and Korea 
Entities
Degree centrality
Japan Korea
1 Local government office 0.64 0.32
2 School, hospital, or other public facilities 0.70 0.61
3 Police 0.65 0.45
4 Firefighting organizations 0.64 0.58
5 Armed forces 0.53 0.31
6 Political parties and politicians 0.25 0.12
7 Local groups 0.42 0.25
8 Volunteers, NPOs, civic groups 0.41 0.35
9 Temple, church, or other religious groups 0.25 0.37
10 Employer 0.42 0.30
11 Co-worker 0.47 0.40
12 Neighbors 0.43 0.32
13 Close family 0.95 0.89
14 Relatives 0.73 0.63
15 Friends and acquaintances 0.73 0.72
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the dispersion of support sources between 
two countries indicate that social support 
networks are more likely to operate together 
when people need help in Japan than are in 
Korea. Korean social support networks are 
segregated from each other within networks, 
indicating that little cooperation exists among 
different sectors as in primary relationships, 
local groups, civic groups, local and central 
governments, and public institutions.   
In Japan, family, relatives, and friends 
are located at the center of the networks, 
suggesting that these sources of social 
support play most important roles in dealing 
with daily problems and concerns among 
Japanese citizens. Religion and politicians 
are located at the fringes of the networks. 
Public institutions including central and local 
governments, police, military, firefighting 
organization, though they are not located 
at the very center of the networks, also 
play crucial roles in coping with the daily 
problems and concerns among Japanese 
ordinary citizens. Note that their locations 
in the networks are not distant from those of 
close family, relatives, and friends.   
In Korea, family, relatives, and friends 
are placed at the center of the networks. 
Similar to the result in Japan, politicians 
and political parties lie most distant from 
the center of the networks in Korea. It is 
interesting to see that central government, 
local government, local groups, and NGOs 
are also located at the periphery of the 
networks, meaning that they function least as 
sources of social supports.   
In both countries, family, friends, and 
relatives are located at the center of the 
networks, displaying that people construct 
their supportive networks centered on private 
and primary personal relationships. Political 
parties and politicians are found on the 
periphery, suggesting that respondents in 
Japan and Korea hardly regard politicians 
as dependable. Although Japan and Korea 
have in common that religious groups are 
little supportive, Koreans depend more 
on religious groups to some extent. The 
importance of formal institutions such 
as local government, police, firefighting 
organization, and armed forces is higher in 
Japan than in Korea. Also, the demarcation 
between primary relationships and formal 
institutions is clearer in Korea than in Japan.
figure 1. The Patterns of Social Support Networks in Japan
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Classification of Support Sources 
In the previous section, we examined the 
patterns of social support networks in Japan 
and Korea by using two-mode social network 
analysis. Based on the results from social 
network analysis, we concluded that family, 
friends, and relatives are the most important 
sources of social support on which people 
rely in Japan and Korea. We also found 
that politicians and religious groups are far 
from the center of support networks. While 
social network analysis clearly shows the 
structure of entire support networks, this 
overall picture only provides us with the 
information on the location and importance 
of each support provider. If we try to identify 
the patterns of social support networks more 
thoroughly, it is necessary to know what 
sources of social support networks to which 
people are connected at the individual level. 
Using LCA, we firstly identify the best 
fitting models for Japan and Korea before 
moving into actual assessment on the latent 
structure of social support networks. In 
order to run LCA, based on the locations of 
social support sources shown in the Figure 
1 and Figure 2, we collapsed 15 support 
sources into 5 categories. As indicated in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4, “public institution” 
includes ‘local government office,’ ‘School, 
hospital, or other public facilities,’ ‘Police,’ 
‘Firefighting organizations,’ ‘Armed forces,’ 
and ‘Political parties and politicians.’ 
‘Local groups’ and ‘Volunteers, NPOs, civic 
groups’ are collapsed into “Local Groups” 
in the figures. “Religious Groups” indicates 
‘Temple, church, or other religious groups.’ 
“Workplace” is composed of ‘Employer’ and 
‘Co-worker.’ The last category of “Family 
and Relatives” includes ‘Neighbors,’ ‘Close 
family,’ ‘Relatives,’ and ‘Friends and 
acquaintances.’
The LCA allows us to determine how 
many classes exist in the sources of social 
support. Among models fitting to the data, 
we selected the best fitting model based on 
chi-square statistic, p-value, BIC and etc. 
calculated by using Latent Gold Statistical 
package. The 4 class model for Japan 
(L2=14.401, 8 df, p=.072) and the 3 class 
model for Korea (L2=21.497, 14 df, p=.089) 
are proved to be the best fitting ones. The 
latent structure of Japanese and Korean’s 
social support networks can be analyzed. 
Figure 3 presents (1) the distribution of 
figure 2. The Patterns of Social Support Networks in Korea
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our sample to each latent class, and (2) the 
conditional probabilities of the five collapsed 
responses of Japanese respondents for each 
latent class. The first class characterizes 
36.7% of Japanese respondents. This group of 
respondents maintains full sources of social 
support, including public (governmental) 
institutions, local groups, religious groups, 
co-workers and employer at the workplace, 
and family, friends and relatives. Respondent 
in this groups have such persons or institutions 
as public institutions (.994), local groups 
(.991), and family, relatives, and friends 
(.993) to ask for help when in need. They rely 
relatively less on religious groups organized 
around temples and churches (.581). We label 
this group as “full social support.” 
We label the second class as “moderate 
social support” because people in this group 
show medium level of probabilities to ask 
for help to all relationships except religious 
groups. Of course, there exist internal 
differences in the probabilities within 
the class. This class has extremely high 
probabilities of maintaining support networks 
for public institutions and family, relatives, 
and friends, whereas it has relatively lower 
level of probabilities for local groups and 
co-workers and employer at the workplace. 
About 33.9% of the Japanese respondents 
fall into this second latent class. 
The third class in the figure characterizes 
17% of Japanese respondents. People in this 
group reveal quite lower probabilities of 
preserving support from all sources compared 
to people in other classes. For example, 
the highest probability of perceived social 
support found in this class is .616 for private 
relationships including family, relatives, 
and friends. Compared to the corresponding 
probabilities of the same source of social 
support in other classes 1, 2, and 4, it is much 
lower. In brief, the class 3 is characterized as 
“lack of social support.” 
The last class accounts for 12.5% of 
the Japanese respondents. This group of 
respondents is somewhat similar to the 
second class in that they usually ask favor 
to the public institutions, family, relative 
and friends, and local groups. Unlike the 
second class, however, this class shows 
extremely low probability of having support 
from people at the workplace. It seems that 
respondents in this category are those who do 
not have a job or look for a job. In case of 
having a job, the likelihood that respondents 
in this category get support from those in 
workplace is almost zero. One thing that 
attracts our attention is their relative higher 
reliance on support from local groups and 
public institutions compared to those in other 
categories. As described previously, local 
groups include voluntary associations and 
NGOs in community and public institutions 
figure 3. Latent Class of Social Support Networks in Japan
Note: Percentages in parenthesis are latent class probabilities for each group.
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are composed of local government, school, 
hospital, or other public facilities, police, 
firefighting organizations. Because people 
in this category respondents in this category 
cannot expect to get support from networks 
formed in workplace, unlike those in the first 
and second categories, they tend to rely on 
other sources of social networks embedded in 
their local communities. Since those sources 
exist in community, we label this category 
as “locally centered social support.” It is 
true that, even within this category, the most 
important sources are family and relatives. 
However, the relative importance of public 
institutions and local groups within this 
category is higher than those within other 
categories.
We turn to the Korean case as shown 
in Figure 4. The patterns of social support 
networks in Korea can be classified into 
three classes. The first class can be labeled 
as “full social support” in that respondents 
in this class tend to perceive that they have 
appropriate sources of social support when 
necessary. This class accounts for 35.7% 
of Korean respondents. The probabilities 
keeping all types of social support are higher 
than any of other classes. The probabilities for 
having public institutions, local groups, and 
personal relations as social support networks 
are .999, .997, and .998, respectively. Even 
for religious groups and workplace related 
relationships, their probabilities are higher 
than .700. 
The second class characterizes 47.4% 
of Korean respondents. People in this class 
reveal high probability (.976) of support 
from family, relatives, and close friends 
and moderate probabilities of supports 
from public institutions (.766) including 
governmental agents. This class shows lower 
probabilities of getting supports from local 
groups (.277), religious groups (.234), and 
relations at the workplace (.372) compared 
to those of the first class. In sum, we label 
this class as “moderate social support” 
where the probabilities that people retain 
support networks are neither extremely high 
nor extremely low except for familial and 
personal relationships. 
The third class in Korea consistently 
shows very low probabilities for all sources 
of social support networks. Only social 
supports from family, relatives, and friends 
exist (.604), but it is also much lower than 
those found in the former two classes. About 
16.1% of Korean respondents fall into this 
class. We characterize this class as “lack of 
social support”.    
Relationship between SES and Sources of 
Social Support in Japan and Korea
Based on the results of LCA above, we 
created a dependent variable containing 
information on classification of support 
figure 4. Latent Class of Social Support Networks in Korea
Note: Percentages in parenthesis are latent class probabilities for each group. 
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sources. Table 4 and 5 report the results of 
a multinomial logistic regression analysis 
on four latent groups of support networks 
in Japan and three of those in Korea, with 
“lack of social support” as references, 
respectively.6 We included socio-economic 
status such as equalized family income 
(family income/number of family members 
who live together), educational attainment 
(university graduate or higher=1), and 
occupation (economically inactive population 
as a reference) as independent variables and 
socio-demographics including age, gender 
(male=1), marital status (married=1), number 
of children, religion (religious=1) as controls. 
We present descriptive statistics among 
control variables of Japan in Table 2 and that 
of Korea in Table 3. 
In Japan, 5,903 (50.0%) respondents 
were male and 7,322 (62.0%) were married. 
7,667 respondents (65.0%) have educational 
attainments equal to or higher than college 
graduates, and the average age is 46.6 
(standard deviation= 13.8, minimum= 20 
and maximum= 70). Among 8,527 (72.2%) 
economically active respondents, 4,415 
(37.4%) are full-time employees, 2,377 
(20.1%) are contract or part-time workers, 
and 322 (2.7%) are unemployed.
In Korea, among 2,000 respondents, 
1,018 (50.9%) are male, 1,264 (63.2%) 
are married, and the average age is 43.1 
(standard deviation= 12.4, minimum= 20 and 
maximum= 69). 1,598 (79.9%) respondents 
have an college degree or higher. 951 (47.6%) 
of the respondents are full-time employees, 
219 (11.0%) are part-time or contract 
workers, 116 (5.8%) are the unemployed, and 
354 (17.7%) are not economically active.  
As reported in Table 4, our model for 
Japan is fitted (log-likelihood = -13,020) to 
the data. In Japan, a respondent is more likely 
to belong to “full social support” group than 
“lack of social support” group if she/ he is 
male (coefficient = .143, p < 0.05), married 
(coefficient = .214, p < 0.01) has more 
children (coefficient = .136, p < 0.001), and 
has religion (coefficient = .644, p < 0.001). 
Among socio-economic status variables, 
educational attainment and working status 
are statistically and positively significant. If 
a respondent has an undergraduate degree 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Frequencies: Japan
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 46.6 13.8 20 71
Number of children 1.1 1.2 0 7
Equalized household income 4,000,099 2,549,181 88,388 24,500,000
Variable frequency %
Full social support 4,749 40.2
Moderate social support 3,470 29.4
Locally centered social support 2,054 17.4
Male 5,903 50.0
Married 7,322 62.0
Religion 3,993 33.8
Education: University or higher 7,667 65.0
Occupation: The Highest 372 3.2
Occupation: Regular employee 4,415 37.4
Occupation: Part-time worker 1,579 13.4
Occupation: Contract worker 798 6.8
Occupation: Self-employed 915 7.8
Occupation: Family worker 126 1.1
Occupation: Looking for job 322 2.7
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or higher (coefficient = .2, p < 0.01), and is 
a full-time employee (coefficient = .18, p < 
0.05), the probability that she/ he belongs 
to “full social support” group rather than 
“lack of social support” group increases. The 
probability of belonging to “moderate social 
support” group rather than “lack of social 
support” group is affected by educational 
attainment. Also, having religion and marital 
status turned out to be significant determinants 
of being a member of the second group rather 
than the reference group. 
The significant determinants of belong-
ing to “locally centered social support” 
group rather than “lack of social support” 
group reveal typical characteristics of social 
support networks in Japan. As indicated in 
the table, the strongest determinant of being 
in “locally centered social support” group 
is working status or occupational status. If 
a respondent reports having no job or with 
lower occupational status, the probability 
of belonging to this group tends to increase. 
That is, a respondent without job or having 
low occupational status is less likely to rely 
on workplace social support when needed. It 
means that those who belong to this category 
rely on other sources of social support 
networks. As shown in the Figure 3 above, 
the relative importance of local groups and 
(locally present) public institutions as social 
support sources within this category is 
greater than those found in other categories. 
Japanese civil society can be characterized 
as “abundant local groups and neighborhood 
associations.” Thus, when the disadvantaged 
confront daily problems and concerns, their 
first choice would be local groups and public 
institutions such as NGOs in community, 
neighborhood associations, local government 
and so on. These locally based social support 
networks in Japan are the closest entities 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Frequencies: Korea
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 44.1 12.36 20 69
Number of children 1.1 1.01 0 5
Equalized household income 286.3 146.55 0.0 975.0
Variable frequency %
full social support 741 37.1
Moderate social support 893 44.7
Lack of social support 366 18.3
Male 1,018 50.9
Married 1,264 63.2
Religion 1,013 50.7
Education: University or higher 1,598 79.9
Occupation: The Highest 15 0.8
Occupation: Regular employee 951 47.6
Occupation: Part-time worker 128 6.4
Occupation: Contract worker 91 4.6
Occupation: Self-employed 315 15.8
Occupation: Family worker 30 1.5
Occupation: Looking for job 116 5.8
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Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression on Latent Classes: Korea
Baseline: Lack of social support Full social support Moderate social support
_cons -0.817 * 0.698 *
Age -0.007 -0.008 
Male 0.405 ** 0.177 
Married -0.140 -0.077 
Number of children 0.248 * 0.139 
Religion 0.987 *** 0.268 *
Education: University or higher 0.139 0.190 
Equalized household income 0.001 * 0.001 *
Occupation: Top management 0.430 -0.516 
Occupation: Full-time employee 0.903 *** -0.128 
Occupation: Part-time worker 0.642 * 0.006 
Occupation: Contract worker -0.061 -0.153 
Occupation: Self-employed 0.337 -0.404 †
Occupation: Family worker 0.071 -1.058 *
Occupation: Looking for job -0.293 -0.197 
N 2,000
Log-likelihood   -1,979.8
Pseudo R-squared 0.047
Note: †p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression on Latent Classes: Japan
Baseline: Lack of Social support Full social support Moderate social support Locally centered social support
_cons 0.056 -0.010 -2.232 ***
Age -0.002 0.004 0.040 ***
Male 0.143 * -0.089 -0.153 †
Married 0.214 ** 0.232 ** 0.252 **
Number of children 0.136 *** -0.002 0.066 †
Religion 0.644 *** 0.196 ** 0.241 **
Education: University or higher 0.200 ** 0.152 * 0.223 **
Equalized household income 0.000 † 0.000 ** 0.000 
Occupation: Top management 0.202 -0.284 -0.664 **
Occupation: Full-time employee 0.180 * -0.023 -0.663 ***
Occupation: Part-time worker 0.175 † -0.060 -0.446 ***
Occupation: Contract worker 0.029 -0.029 -0.656 ***
Occupation: Self-employed -0.001 -0.012 -0.237 †
Occupation: Family worker 0.496 0.226 0.048 
Occupation: Looking for job -0.264 -0.080 -0.484 *
N 10,434
Log-likelihood -13,020.0
Pseudo R-squared 0.035
Note: †p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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which ordinary citizens can actually rely on 
in order to cope with daily problems and 
concerns.
Table 5 includes the result of multinomial 
logistic regression on the probability of latent 
classes in Korea. In the case of Korea, our 
model is also fitted to the data (log-likelihood 
= -1,979.8). As in the Japanese case, the 
reference category is “lack of social support” 
group. A Korean respondent is more likely 
to belong to “full support” group rather than 
to “lack of social support” group if she/he 
is male (coefficient = .405, p < 0.001), has 
higher number of children (coefficient = .248, 
p < 0.05), has religion (coefficient = .987, 
p < 0.001), has higher household income 
(coefficient = .001, p < 0.05) and is a full-
time employee (coefficient = .903, p < 0.001) 
or a part-time worker (coefficient = .642, 
p < 0.05). In brief, gender, parental status, 
and religion among socio-demographics are 
statistically associated with being a member 
of “full social support” group rather than a 
member of “lack of social support” group. 
These results are similar to those in Japan. 
However, in Korea, educational attainment 
has affiliation with the “full social support” 
group. Only when occupational status is 
higher, the probability that she/he receives 
help in difficult times from all sources of 
social support increases in Korea. Having 
religion, more income, being a family 
worker are affecting the probabilities that 
a respondent belongs to “moderate social 
support” group rather than “lack of social 
support” group in Korea. 
dISCUSSION
So far, we have examined the patterns of 
social support networks in Japan and Korea, 
assuming that people in two countries 
intentionally construct their support networks 
to cope with daily problems and concerns. 
Social network analysis, latent class analysis, 
and multinomial logistic regression reveal 
similar or different patterns of social support 
networks between two countries as follows. 
First, based on the degree centrality of 
all support sources in Japan and Korea, we 
found that family, close friends, and relatives 
have the greatest degree centrality within 
networks. This suggests that the majority of 
the respondents rely on primary relationships 
when they are in trouble. Political parties 
and politicians are regarded as being the 
least supportive in two countries. While the 
degree centrality of local groups is as high 
as other sources of social support in Japan, it 
is the second lowest in Korea. This confirms 
well-known characteristics of civil societies, 
“plethora of local and neighborhood 
associations” for Japan and “civil society 
without citizens” for Korea. 
Second, judging from the results of 
entire network pictures, in Japan and Korea, 
family, friends, and relatives are located at the 
center of the networks, displaying that people 
construct their supportive networks centered 
on private and primary personal relationships. 
Political parties and politicians are found on 
the periphery, suggesting that respondents in 
Japan and Korea hardly regard politicians 
as dependable. On the other hand, Japanese 
respondents tend to rely on public institutions 
as well as personal relationships when they 
are in trouble whereas Korean respondents 
likely ask help to fewer sources of support. 
These differences in the dispersion of support 
sources between two countries indicate that 
social support networks are more likely to 
operate together when people need help in 
Japan than are in Korea.
Third, the latent class analysis allows 
us to determine the number of latent class 
regarding the sources of social support. We 
found that there exist the 4 latent classes 
(full social support, moderate social support, 
locally centered social support, lack of social 
support) for Japan and the 3 latent classes 
(full social support, moderate social support, 
lack of social support) for Korea. This 
difference in the number of latent classes 
should be caused by the fact that religious 
groups function as a source of social support 
in Korea, whereas they do not function at all 
in Japan. 
Lastly, aligned with our expectation, 
the effects of socio-economic status on the 
receiving social support from various sources 
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are statistically significant in Japan and 
Korea. The more one is educated, the higher 
one is located in the occupational ladder, and 
the wealthier one is, the more one gets help 
from diverse social relationships, so called 
stratification of social support. 
Obviously, our study exposes the nature, 
features, and contents of social support 
in Japan and Korea based on the results 
from SNA, LCA, and multinomial logistic 
regression. The findings in this study can 
contribute to understandings of how the 
patterns of social support networks are in two 
countries and give some insights of why they 
look like. However, this study did not deal 
with the consequences of patterns for Japan 
and Korea. Future study should thoroughly 
investigate the effects of patterns on various 
aspects of lives among ordinary citizens in 
Japan and Korea.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the MEXT-Supported Program 
for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities 
of Japan, 2014-2018 (S1491003). “International Comparative 
Surveys on Lifestyle and Values” were designed and conducted 
by the Center for Social Well-being Studies, Institute for the 
Development of Social Intelligence, Senshu University, Japan, 
in collaboration with Social Well-being Research Consortium in 
Asia.
Notes
1. This work was supported by the National Research 
Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean 
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2. There are different statistics or estimates of income 
inequalities in Japan and Korea, depending on which data 
sources are analyzed and which estimation methods are 
employed. In this paper, we use data from IMF as of 2016.
3. For detailed explanation of the survey method and 
characteristics, see Yee et al. (2016).
4. The geodesic distance of the nodes in a graph measures the 
shortest path between nodes (Wasserman and Faust 1996). 
Thus, the more actively linked actors are likely to gather in 
a more central position on a global network graph based on 
geodesic distance.
5. Degree centrality is a nodal degree referring to the number 
of ties that the focal node has. The degree centrality (CD) of 
the node (ni) is calculated by:
CD (ni)= 
d(ni)  ,g
 g=group size of the other mode (indivicuals),d(ni )
=degree of an actor i
 Thus, the degree centrality of a certain node can contain a 
minimum value of “0” (have no links at all) and a maximum 
value of “1” (have links to every node in a network). 
According to Wasserman and Faust (1996), central actors 
must be the most active because they have the most ties to 
other actors in the network graph (Wasserman and Faust 
1996: 178). 
6. LCA parameters and multinomial logit coefficients are not 
estimated at the same time. Based on the results from LCA, 
we created dependent variables whose categories range 
from “no social support” to “full social support” in Japan 
and Korea. Setting the “no social support” as reference, we 
ran multinomial logistic regression. Note that it has nothing 
to do with simultaneous equation model (SEM).
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